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FEDERAL ACCOUNTABILITY: DELEGATION OF 
RESPONSIBILITY BY HUD UNDER NEPA 
Ned Notis-McConarty* 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 19691 (NEPA) is the 
only statute designed to function as an environmental mandate to 
all federal agencies. NEPA does not explicitly establish pollution 
control programs. Rather, it states a broad policy that federal agen-
cies must consider environmental factors as an integral part of their 
decision-making process.2 This general mandate has been the object 
of extensive controversy and commentary. NEPA was the subject of 
almost five hundred judicial decisions during its first five years.3 
While judicial interpretation has clarified many issues presented by 
NEPA, others remain in controversy. 
Section 102(2)(C) of NEPN requires preparation of an environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) by the "responsible official" prior 
to "Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment."5 One issue presented by this provision is the defini-
tion of "responsible official." Since Section 102(2)(C) is directed at 
"all agencies of the Federal Government,"6 federal administrators 
are clearly responsible, at least in some degree, for compliance with 
this section. However, federal administrators need not necessarily 
accept total responsibility for compliance. 
t Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
I 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970). 
• Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 
F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
• S. Deutsch, The National Environmental Policy Act's First Five Years, 4 ENV. AFF. 3 
(1975). 
• 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). 
• Id. 
• Id. 
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Delegation of EIS preparation has been dealt with in several fo-
rums. First, extensive litigation culminated in a fundamental dis-
agreement between United States courts of appeals. Second, the 
delegation issue prompted Congress to amend NEPA. Third, dele-
gation of NEPA responsibility forms the core of a controversy over 
recent environmental regulations promulgated by the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 
This article examines the extent to which a federal administrator 
may delegate responsibility for compliance with Section 102(2)(C) 
to state and local officials, focusing primarily upon the HUD regula-
tions. However, background for discussion of the regulations re-
quires some consideration of the split between the court of appeals 
and the amendment to NEPA.7 
I. JUDICIAL DISAGREEMENT OVER THE EXTENT OF DELEGATION 
PERMISSIBLE UNDER NEPA 
A. Greene County 
The standards of permissible EIS delegation were first articulated 
in Greene County· Planning Commission v. Federal Power 
Commission. 8 The Federal Power Commission (FPC) had promul-
gated regulations providing that a license applicant submit a draft 
EIS which would serve as the sole basis for the FPC's environmental 
review. 9 FPC officials, however, conducted field investigations to 
assess the applicant's environmental conclusion. Nevertheless, the 
Second Circuit rejected FPC reliance upon the draft EIS prepared 
by the applicant, finding that the federal agency had a "primary 
and non-delegable responsibility"IO to prepare the EIS. The primary 
reason for this finding was the court's belief that the applicant's 
statement was likely to be based upon "self-serving assumptions."11 
The court found that such assumptions would be difficult to detect 
by reviewing an EIS totally prepared by the applicant. Allowing 
such assumptions into the EIS would defeat the NEPA objective of 
informing the public how the agency had weighed environmental 
concems. 12 Once an EIS based on self-serving assumptions was cir-
7 The issues are not treated in strict chronological order, for the amendment to NEPA 
actually took place on August 9, 1975. See text at note 44, infra. The HUD regulations were 
promulgated on January 7, 1975. See text at notes 109-112, infra. 
• 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). 
• 18 C.F.R. § 2.81 (1971). 
'0 455 F.2d at 420. 
II Id. 
'2 Id. at 419. 
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culated for comment to other agencies and discussed at formal hear-
ings, the court thought that little revision of the statement was 
likely. This tendency was referred to as the "status quo syn-
drome."13 The Second Circuit rejected the contention that court 
action by citizens would be sufficient safeguard against self-serving 
assumptions, insisting that the federal agency had responsibility for 
ensuring objective environmental review. The court held that the 
FPC procedure constituted a total abdication of that responsibil-
ity." 
Dispute developed as to the precise degree of delegation permissi-
ble under Greene County. Some commentators interpreted the case 
as prohibiting the applicant from gathering facts upon which the 
EIS would be based. 15 However, Greene County did not necessarily 
go this far.'8 This uncertainty notwithstanding, commentators at 
the time perceived that the Greene County approach was the logi-
cal, desirable solution to the delegation problem. J7 Other courts of 
appeals did not agree. 
B. The Greene County Holding 
In Life of the Land v. Brinegar,18 the Ninth Circuit led other 
circuit courts in limiting Greene County so severely as to almost 
reject that decision. The court in Life of the Land upheld an EIS 
prepared by a state agency and a private consulting firm. The court 
found that the federal agency "actively participated in all phases 
of the preparation process" and that the EIS was "more or less a 
joint effort"19 between the consulting firm and federal and state 
officials. The court recognized that the consulting firm had a finan-
cial stake in the approval of the project, but noted that there was 
no evidence of self-serving assumptions by the consulting firm or the 
state agency.20 Both parties to the litigation conceded that NEPA 
,3 Id. at 421. 
II Id. at 420. 
" Comment, The Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements by State Highway 
Commissions, 58 IOWA L. REV. 1268, 1270 (1973) [hereinafter cited as State Highway 
Commissions]. 
" The court did not rule out all participation by an FPC license applicant in the EIS 
preparation. The court suggested that the Atomic Energy Commission procedures (36 Fed. 
Reg. 18071, Sept. 9, 1971) would suffice. Those procedures allowed the federal agency to use 
a statement prepared by the applicant as a basis for its own draft EIS. 455 F.2d at 422. 
17 State Highway Commissions, supra note 15, at 1275. 
18 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974). 
" Id. at 467 . 
.. Id. 
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required the federal agency to retain legal responsibility for the 
ultimate work product. 21 Regular meetings between federal officials, 
state officials, and the consulting firm, accompanied by active re-
view of the EIS by the federal agency, was sufficient in the court's 
opinion.22 
Life of the Land distinguished Greene County, finding that the 
federal agency had not totally abdicated its responsibility in this 
instance. "Good faith objectivity" in the preparation of the EIS was 
all that was required.23 The issues discussed in both cases, however, 
were identical. The degree of federal agency participation in Life of 
the Land was not significantly greater than that in Greene County, 
despite the assertions of the court.24 The disparate results cannot be 
explained in terms of meaningful factual differences. Rather, the 
Ninth Circuit applied a standard of review fundamentally at odds 
with that used in Greene County. Greene County did not strike 
down the FPC procedure because of evidence of self-serving as-
sumptions in that case. The court emphasized the mere likelihood 
of such assumptions, and the need for procedural safeguards against 
them. Potentialities, not proven facts, were the basis of the Greene 
County holding. In Life of the Land, the Ninth Circuit held that a 
degree of federal involvement no greater than that of Greene County 
supplied sufficient procedural safeguards, emphasizing that no 
proof of actual self-serving assumptions had been offered. The 
Ninth Circuit thus upheld an EIS effectively prepared by a party 
with a direct financial interest in minimizing interference with the 
project. The standards established in Greene County would surely 
preclude approval of an EIS prepared under such circumstances. 
The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits faced the delegation issue in the context of delegation by 
the Federal Highway Administration (FHW A). Each of the four 
circuits reached conclusions substantially equivalent to those of Life 
of the Land. The FHWA procedure provided that a state applying 
for funds would prepare the EIS, which would be subjected to envi-
ronmental review. The FHWA and the United States Department 
" [d. 
22 [d. 
23 [d. 
24 The FPC in Greene County had conducted field investigation and reviewed the final work 
product. 455 F.2d at 416,420. In Life of the Land, the United States Dept. of Transportation 
held meetings with the state and private agencies preparing the EIS, and the EIS was 
ultimately reviewed in Washington. 485 F.2d at 467. 
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of Transportation would then review the EIS.25 The Eighth Circuit 
upheld the FHWA procedure, emphasizing that the FHW A had 
recommended changes in the draft EIS in question and had added 
information.2ft Terming this "significant and active" federal partici-
pation, the court purported to distinguish Greene County on its 
facts. 27 The Tenth Circuit upheld a statement prepared under 
FHWA procedure "in consultation with" federal officials.28 This 
court also distinguished Greene County on factual grounds, finding 
that the federal agency had not merely "rubber stamped" the appli-
cant's statement.29 The Fourth and Fifth Circuits summarily upheld 
the FHWA procedure.30 
C. The Second Circuit Affirms Greene County in Conservation 
Society 
In December, 1974, the Second Circuit dispelled all doubt as to 
the continuing vitality of the Greene County holding. In 
Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. Secretary of 
Transportation,31 the court reaffirmed Greene County and high-
lighted the fundamental incompatibility of the Second Circuit's 
approach with that of the majority circuits. Conservation Society 
echoed many of the points expressed in Greene County but clarified 
some points and introduced additional considerations. 
Conservation Society clarified the standards required for proper 
EIS preparation, stating that "transposing the federal duty to pre-
pare the EIS to a state agency is thus unlikely to result in as dispas-
sionate an appraisal of environmental considerations as the federal 
agency itself could produce" [emphasis added].32 The EIS proce-
dure was thus compared with the maximum objectivity possible: 
complete federal agency preparation of the EIS. This approach con-
trasted sharply with that taken by the "majority circuits," which 
evaluated the EIS procedure with reference to a minimum: that 
.. Federal Highway Administration Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, 37 Fed. Reg. 
21809 (1972) . 
.. Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849,854 (8th Cir. 1973). 
" [d . 
• 8 Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870,873 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 936 (1974) . 
.. [d. 
30 Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974); Finish Alatoona's 
Interstate Right, Inc. v. Brinegar, 484 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1973). 
31 508 F.2d 927 .. (2d Cir. 1974), vacated sub nom., Coleman v. Conservation Society of 
Southern Vermont, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 3181 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1975). 
3' [d. at 931. 
/ 
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degree of federal agency participation in the preparation process 
sufficient to overcome the charge of a "rubber stamp" or a "total 
abdication." 
Conservation Society introduced the consideration of judicial 
economy into the delegation debate. The court pointed out that the 
Greene County approach offered a clear standard which would allow 
agencies to order their activities to avoid litigation.33 While reducing 
litigation, the Greene County standard was also seen as ensuring 
more effective enforcement of NEPA. The federal agency would 
avoid the self-serving assumptions which might go unnoticed in an 
EIS prepared by an applicant. The court thus observed that the 
Greene County approach would result in better NEPA enforcement 
with less judicial involvement.34 The court dismissed the practical 
problems, such as insufficient personnel, of requiring total federal 
EIS preparation.35 
D. Synopsis and Assessment 
Most circuits purported to apply the standard of review of Greene 
County while reaching the opposite result. They attempted to dis-
tinguish Greene County on the basis of factual differences. Some 
commentators agreed, asserting that no fundamental difference 
existed between the standard of review applied by the Second Cir-
cuit and that of the majority circuits.36 Conservation Society clearly 
established, however, that the Second Circut would find "total ab-
dication" in a number of cases upheld by the majority circuitsY The 
majority circuits purported to require good faith objectivity and 
33 Id. at 932 . 
.. Id. 
35 Id. The court in Conservation Society also relied upon the obligation of the state agency 
to implement programs established by the state legislature. The state agency was legally 
obligated to act as an advocate of the proposed project and might be acting improperly in 
performing an objective environmental assessment.ld. at 931. The importance of this ground 
was diminished by the Second Circuit's finding of illegal delegation in 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. 
Burns, 517 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1975), where the state agency was under no obligation to act 
as an advocate. 
" The CEQ, for example, took the position that no fundamental difference existed between 
the tests applied in the Second Circuit and that applied in the majority circuits. S. REP. No. 
94-152, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1975). But see Hearings on H.R. 3130 Before the House Comm. 
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1975)(Statement of N. Tie-
mann) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 3130]. 
37 The EIS struck down in Conservation Society was the subject of frequent meetings 
between FHWA and state officials. The FHWA Division Engineer made a field inspection 
specifically to discuss environmental review with state officials. The draft EIS prepared by 
the state was reviewed and sent back to the state for further consideration before being 
approved by FHWA. Hearings on H.R. 3130, supra note 36, at 17-18. 
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active federal participation in the EIS preparation. These standards 
emphasized a flexible approach and a case by case analysis of the 
facts. The majority approach did not assume a likelihood of state 
bias which would render inadequate all state prepared environmen-
tal assessments. Rather, the majority circuits sought to encourage 
cooperation between state and federal officials. This approach 
might have the advantage of encouraging environmental assessment 
in the early stages of a project.3S The states could not merely leave 
the responsibility for environmental assessment to federal officials 
who often become involved well after the start of a project. Instead, 
the State would begin environmental assessment in the early stages 
of a project, ensuring that fewer alternatives were foreclosed prior 
to consideration of environmental factors. 
One possible reading of the majority circuit cases was that they 
approached EIS procedure in negative terms. If federal 
participation was not a "rubber stamp" or a "total abdication," the 
EIS was upheld. In fact, no majority court struck down an EIS on 
the basis of the degree of federal participation. In addition to these 
negative requirements, the majority circuits suggested that there 
was an affirmative requirement of "active federal participation." 
Yet the majority courts found active federal participation wherever 
they found no "total abdication." Thus, whether this purported 
affirmative requirement has any substantive import is unclear. 
The majority approach did insist on some procedural safeguards. 
For instance, the federal agency was required to accept legal respon-
sibility for the ultimate EIS and the federal officials were required 
to participate, at least minimally, in the preparation of the state-
ment. The majority courts recognized the possibility of self-serving 
assumptions even if the federal agency complied with these require-
ments, but insisted upon evidence of the assumptions. 
On balance, the Second Circuit approach is clearly more consis-
tent with NEPA. NEPA allows no discretion in procedural matters, 
for Section 102(2)(C) requires that the procedures of NEPA be im-
plemented "to the fullest extent possible."39 The procedural require-
ments were thus phrased in terms of maximums. NEPA requires 
more than sufficient procedural safeguards and an openness to proof 
of violation. This emphasis must be seen in light of the great diffi-
culty in producing evidence that self-serving assumptions have 
" The importance of environmental input early in the project development is widely 
recognized. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy 
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
39 [d. at 1112. 
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caused misleading omissions from an EIS. Additionally, the Second 
Circuit was probably accurate in its assessment of the practical 
results of its approach. Clear standards put agencies on notice as to 
how they can avoid litigation. The insistence by the majority cir-
cuits on "good faith objectivity"40 or significant federal participa-
tion41 established standards which are perhaps dissimilar and cer-
tainly nebulous. The Second Circuit approach would also improve 
enforcement. A federal agency required to put together an EIS 
would be far more likely to notice improper assumptions or insuffi-
cient treatment of an issue than it would if required only to read 
through an EIS prepared by an applicant for funds. Without a thor-
ough knowledge of a project it is often difficult to detect what was 
left out of an EIS. 
In any event, the Second Circuit decision in Conservation Society 
led to an impasse in the delegation debate. An almost total cessa-
tion in federally funded highway construction within the jurisdic-
tion resulted. 42 The situation became increasingly critical as the 
Seventh Circuit and a district court in Massachusetts both decided 
in favor of the Second Circuit approach.43 Rather than wait for the 
Supreme Court to reconcile the differences, Congress amended 
NEPA. 
II. THE NEP A AMENDMENT 
On August 9, 1975, President Ford signed into law an amendment 
to NEPA which significantly changed the nature of the delegation 
debate.44 The amendment, which provided that under certain cir-
cumstances an EIS could be prepared by a state applying for federal 
funds, was passed in direct reaction to the Conservation Society 
holding.45 The amendment allowed delegation only if: 1) the state 
agency preparing the EIS exercised statewide jurisdiction; 2) the 
federal agency furnished guidance and participated in the prepara-
tion of the statement; 3) the federal agency independently evalu-
ated the statement and then adopted the statement as its own; 4) 
I. Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 467 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 
961 (1974). 
" Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849,854 (8th Cir. 1973). 
" Hearings on H.R. 3130, supra note 36, at 12. Some critics charged that the "crisis" was 
a product of over-dramatization by the FHWA. Newsletter of Political Action for Clean Air, 
Inc., May 2, 1975 (on file at ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS office, Newton, MA). 
I> Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975); Essex County Preservation Ass'n v. 
Campbell, 399 F. Supp. 208 (D. Mass. 1975) . 
.. Pub.L. No. 94-83, § 102(2)(D), 89 Stat. 424 (1975). 
'" S. REP. No. 94-152, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1975). 
1976] HUD ACCOUNTABILITY 129 
the federal official prepared a written assessment of any disagree-
ment over the environmental impact of the project; and 5) the pro-
gram was funded by federal grants to the states. 46 These limitations 
on the extent of permitted delegation manifest the intent of Con-
gress to embody the approach to NEPA delegation taken by the 
majority of the courts of appeals}7 These limitations indicate a 
sensitivity to potential abuses of unlimited NEPA delegation. This 
sensitivity is evidenced by notable caution in the wording and place-
ment of the amendment to keep NEPA delegation within clearly 
described boundaries.48 
Several considerations cast doubt on the wisdom of the amend-
ment. First, the need for the amendment was not clearly estab-
lished. It was drafted in order to assure that the approach of the 
majority circuits to NEPA delegation and not that of Conservation 
Society, was embodied in NEPA. Some commentators at the time, 
however, suggested that no significant difference existed between 
the two approaches to NEPA delegation. 49 Additionally, the Su-
preme Court had agreed to review the Conservation Society hold-
ing,50 assuring a timely judicial resolution of the conflict in the ab-
sence of legislative action. Congress felt that legislative action was 
necessary to avert the financial problems attendant to a halt in 
highway construction in the Second Circuit, and believed that the 
situation was too serious to allow the additional time necessary for 
the Supreme Court to settle the dispute. Yet it was unclear at the 
time whether serious interruption of highway construction occurred 
or whether legislative action was the proper solution to the prob-
lem.51 Furthermore the amendment, embodying the majority circuit 
approach, contained all of the disadvantages of that approach, in-
cluding lack of clear standards and retreat from the mandate that 
NEPA procedures be implemented to the fullest extent possible. 
The merits of the amendment and the effect it will be likely to 
have on environmental enforcement continue to be matters of cru-
cial importance. This subject warrants a discussion more extensive 
than can be undertaken within the scope of this article. The history 
.. Pub.L. No. 94·83 § 102(2)(D), 89 Stat. 424 (1975). 
" S. REP. No. 94-152, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1975) . 
•• [d. at II. 
.. See supra note 36. 
5. Conservation Society was granted certiorari, but was vacated after the 1975 NEPA 
amendment, 44 U.S.L.W. 3181 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1975). 
" The Senate Conference Report on H.R. 3130 observed that 91% of the FHWA projects 
were too small to be affected by NEPA, and other projects were delayed by problems other 
than NEPA. S. REP. No. 94-152, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1975). 
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of the amendment demonstrates that, regardless of its merits, care-
ful attention was focused on the proposal. A full discussion of the 
merits occurred both in committees and on the floor of Congress. 
The amendment attempted an informed solution to a problem 
which Congress found pressing enough to warrant legislative action. 
Unfortunately the NEPA delegation issue has not always been 
treated with such sensitivity. Just one year prior to the passage of 
the NEPA amendment, Congress demonstrated its potential for 
uniform uninformed, insensitive treatment of NEPA delegation in 
the Housing and Community Development Act of 197452 
(Community Development Act). 
Ill. DELEGATION OF EIS PREPARATION BY HUD 
On January 7, 1975, the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment promulgated environmental regulations pursuant to Sec-
tion 104(h)(1) of the Community Development Act.53 The regula-
tions present the greatest allowance of delegation of NEPA 
responsibilities to non-federal officials to date. The process by which 
increased delegation became law is significant, as is the substantive 
impact of such delegation on environmental enforcement. 
A. The Community Development Act 
A near crisis atmosphere pervaded Congress during its considera-
tion of housing legislation in 1974. On January 8,1973, the Secretary 
of HUD had issued orders to all regional offices to refuse all applica-
tions under major federal housing programs.54 Though challenged in 
court,55 the impoundment of housing funds by the Nixon Adminis-
tration was successful in cutting off virtually all federal housing 
assistance. At the same time twenty-five per cent of the population 
was housed in substandard, overcrowded or overpriced accommoda-
tions, and that percentage was rising annually.56 The mood in Con-
gress was typified by the comment of one representative that he 
52 42 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (Supp. 1974). 
" The January regulations were updated on July 16, 1975 (40 Fed. Reg. 29991) and on May 
22, 1975 (40 Fed. Reg. 22253). They are codified in 24 C.F.R. § 58 (1975). 
" Remarks of George Romney, Sec'y of HUD, 29th Annual Convention of the National 
Ass'n of Home Builders (Jan. 8, 1973), in A. BERNEY, J. GOLDBERG, J. DOOLEY & D. CARROLL, 
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE POOR 493 (1975). 
50 Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 501 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
50 In 1960 there were 4.7 million Americans living in substandard housing. In 1970 the 
number had increased to 7 million. 120 CONGo REc. 5397-98 (daily ed. June 20, 1974)(remarks 
of Representative Burke). 
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"would place the housing needs of this country subordinate only to 
two other more pressing demands: the need to curb inflation and the 
need to reduce interest rates .... "57 
Many proposals were introduced in Congress to alleviate the 
crisis. The bill which emerged from 8enate Committee was 8.3066, 
an omnibus bill dealing with many different aspects of community 
development needs.58 8.3066 was a complicated piece of legislation 
which was the product of four years of legislative effort.59 The most 
significant feature of the bill was a major change in the mode of 
grant allocations.6o Formerly federal assistance had been dispensed 
through categorical grants. Communities had applied for funds for 
project categories such as urban beautification, historic preserva-
tion, and sanitary code enforcement.6! Under the new system of 
allocation created by Title 1 of 8.3066, funds would be dispensed in 
block grants. The amount of federal assistance to a community 
would be computed, and the community would then be given con-
siderable discretion as to how the funds were spent, since no federal 
project-by-project approval was involved under the block grant sys-
tem. The thrust of 8.3066 was to allow flexibility and broad discre-
tion to communities using funds. 62 The bill was seen as a step toward 
a "new federalism" in which the federal government placed in-
creased power in the hands of local officials.63 8.3066, as passed by 
the 8enate on March 11, made no mention of NEPA. 
On June 20, the House passed its version of the Community De-
velopment Act. The House version grew out of H.R.15361,64 a pro-
posal which was similar to 8.3066 in many ways. One significant 
difference between H.R.15361 and 8.3066 was that the House ver-
sion expressly authorized delegation of NEPA responsibility by 
HUD for the community development programs. H.R.15361 stated 
in relevant part: 
51 120 CONGo REC. 5392 (daily ed. June 20, 1974)(remarks of Representative Pepper) . 
.. The chairman of the conference committee described this bill as the single most impor-
tant housing legislation since the National Housing Act of 1934. He observed that the bill re-
wrote all of the landmark housing legislation passed in the previous 40 years. 120 CONGo REC. 
14878-79 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974) (remarks of Senator Sparkman). 
51 120 CONGo REC. 14879 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974) (remarks of Senator Sparkman). 
eo S. REP. No. 93-693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974). 
" See, e.g., The Public Facilities Loan Program authorized by Title II of the Housing 
Amendments of 1955; The Model Cities Program, and Urban Renewal, Code Enforcement 
and Neighborhood Development Programs. 120 CONGo REc. 14886 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974). 
S. REp. No. 93-693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1974). 
"' S. REP. No. 93-693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); in UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. 
NEWS 3779-3781 (1974) . 
.. 120 CONGo REC. 5367 (daily ed. June 20, 1974) (remarks of Representative Anderson) . 
.. The text ofH.R. 15361 is printed at 120 CONGo REC. 5406 et seq. (daily ed. June 20,1974). 
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In order to assure that the policies of the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969 are most effectively implemented in connection with the 
expenditure of funds under this title, and to assure to the public undi-
minished protection of the environment, the Secretary, in lieu of the 
environmental protection procedures otherwise applicable, may under 
regulations provide for the release of funds for particular projects to 
applicants who assume all of the responsibilities for environmental re-
view, decision-making, and action pursuant to such Act that would 
apply to the Secretary were he to undertake such projects as Federal 
projects. The Secretary shall issue regulations to carry out this subsec-
tion only after consultation witlf the Council of Environmental Qual-
ity.65 
The wisdom of excepting community development projects from the 
usual NEPA requirement of federal agency accountability for the 
project's EIS is debatable. Clearly, however, this exception should 
have been debated openly before enactment into law. It was not. 
B. Section 104(h) 
Section 104(h)(1) of the Community Development Act was the 
subject of little debate in the House of Representatives and only ex 
post facto consideration in the Senate. The section of H.R.15361 
which later became Section 104(h)(1) of the Community Develop-
ment Act was discussed on less than one page of the accompanying 
House report.66 On the floor of the House, one representative re-
quested an explanation for the provision. He was given a hasty 
assurance that the section would not weaken NEPA enforcement.67 
After passage by the House, H.R.15361 was sent to Conference Com-
mittee to be reconciled with S.3066. The Conference Committee 
adopted the House provision relating to NEPA, and it became Sec-
tion 104(h)(1) of S.3066 as reported after more than a month of work 
in conference. 
On August 13, 1974, the Senate began debate on the Conference 
Committee version of the Community Development Act. That ver-
sion contained Section 104(h)(1), which the Senate had never before 
considered or debated. The bill was perceived as one of the most 
important measures of the session.68 It was the product of extensive 
labor and a delicate balance of interests. The bill dealt with many 
different aspects of the housing problem which demanded immedi-
" 120 CONGo REC. 5407 (daily ed. June 20, 1974) . 
.. H. REP. No. 93-114, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974). 
67 120 CONGo REC. 5362 (daily ed. June 20, 1974) (remarks of Representative Barrett). 
" See supra note 58. 
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ate attention. The Senate was then faced with the choice of either 
voting for the omnibus bill with one questionable provision which 
had not been considered, or jeopardizing the whole package. The 
Senate hesitated even to engage in extensive debate on the measure. 
Only Senator Jackson objected to the procedure through which Sec-
tion 104(h)(1) was presented to the Senate as a fait accompli, say-
ing: 
I hope that this will be the last time we are confronted with an "11th 
hour" decision on a provision which would erode the effectiveness of 
NEPA without having the benefit of study and full debate in the Senate. 
Unfortunately, I doubt that this will be the case. There are forces which 
would diminish the effectiveness of NEPA at every opportunity.69 
Despite his objections, even Senator Jackson voted for the bill. In 
light of the crisis existing at the time of consideration, passage of 
the bill was inevitable. 70 
Adding Section 104(h)(1) in Conference Committee was only one 
aspect of the questionable procedure involved. This one short 
subsection was added to a long, complex piece of legislation which 
on its face had nothing to do with NEPA.71 Such "indirect amend-
ment" is particularly irresponsible where, as in this case, it exempts 
a program from NEPA procedures, since one of the greatest 
strengths of NEPA is that it is a general environmental mandate to 
all federal agencies.72 
C. The Substantive Import of Section 104(h)(l) 
The significance of Section 104(h)(1) in the NEPA delegation 
debate is obvious from a comparison with the amendment to NEPA 
passed one year after the passage of the Community Development 
Act.n The 1975 NEPA amendment permitted delegation only 
within boundaries carefully defined by Congress to avoid irresponsi-
ble delegation which would defeat the NEP A mandate of federal 
accountability. It authorized delegation only to agencies with state-
wide jurisdiction.74 Section 104(h)(1) allows delegation to any appli-
cant, including local government officials. The NEPA amendment 
" 120 CONGo REC. 14885 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974) (remarks of Senator Jackson). 
70 The vote was 84 in favor, none opposed and 16 abstaining. 120 CONGo REC. 14899 (daily 
ed. Aug. 13, 1974). 
71 [d. at 14884. 
72 [d. at 14885. Congress recognized this factor and rejected an indirect amendment to 
NEPA the following year. S. REP. No. 94-152, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1975). 
73 Pub. L. No. 94-83 § 102(2)(D), 89 Stat. 424 (1975). 
71 [d. § 102(2)(D)(i). 
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explicitly required the federal agency to retain ultimate responsibil-
ity for the EIS.75 Section 104(h)(1) places no such limitation on the 
delegation, providing that applicants would "assume all of the res-
ponsibilities for environmental review, decision making and action 
... " under N.'ePA. Section 104(h)(1) does not require the federal 
agency to be involved at all in the EIS preparation, in contrast with 
the NEPA amendment which requires federal agency participation 
and guidance. 
The role of HUn under Section 104(h)(1) is limited to assuring 
that the delegation of NEPA responsibility is accomplished effi-
ciently. The Secretary of HUn has fulfilled all NEPA obligations if 
the applicant claims ("certifies") that it has complied with NEPA 
and will take legal responsibility for that compliance. The delega-
tion of NEPA responsibility is thus almost complete. After certifica-
tion, HUn is to approve the project and any challenge to compliance 
with NEPA must then be directed toward the applicant, not the 
agency.76 
A number of considerations support the exemption of community 
development programs from usual NEPA procedures. These pro-
grams often focus on crises, such as the housing shortage, which 
require immediate relief. Such desperate needs often force environ-
mental concerns into the background.77 Although housing programs 
need not conflict with environmental concerns, even among observ-
ers who perceive such possible compatibility, many claim that 
NEPA is an awkward instrument for reconciling the two interests.78 
Critics initially point to the financial burden of NEPA compli-
ance.79 This burden is particularly significant in regard to housing, 
for lack of funds has always plagued government housing 
programs.80 Federal housing programs rely primarily on private de-
velopers who may hesitate to undertake the added expense ofNEPA 
compliance. Additionally, the cost of compliance does not 
15 Id. § 102(2)(D). 
" Community Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5304(h)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
77 M. Durschslag, P. Junger, HUD and the Human Environment: A Preliminary Analysis 
of the Impact of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Upon the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 58 IOWA L. REV. 805, 809 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
NEPA and HUD). 
" B. Ackerman, Impact Statements and Low Cost Housing, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 754, 800 
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Ackerman). 
79 The cost of impact statement preparation for a 400-unit housing project is estimated at 
$20,000-$30,000 per year during construction. Id. at 76l. 
'" R. Pozen, The Financing of Local Housing Authorities: A Contract Approach for Public 
Corporations, 82 YALE L.J. 1208, 1208-09 (1973). 
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necessarily correlate with the size of the project and may over-
burden small projects.81 
Furthermore, NEPA procedures often result in considerable 
delay.82 The delays caused by extensive record keepjng may be com-
pounded by the possibility of extended litigation over environmen-
tal issues. Delay in the construction of a housing project may render 
unfeasible a tightly budgeted program.83 Delay also allows more 
time for community groups to mobilize opposition to the project. 
Time for community reaction can be a positive result ofNEPA, and 
indeed NEPA was meant' to allow increased public awareness of the 
environmental effects of government action. 84 However, particularly 
in the case of housing, the result may not be desirable, for the 
opposition which mobilizes may have little or nothing to do with 
environmental issues. 
NEPA has been abused by community groups attempting to 
block the entry of low income citizens (hence racial minorities) into 
their neighborhoods.85 Some controversy persists over the extent to 
which "environment" as referred to in NEPA includes the social 
environment.86 Clearly, however, NEPA was not meant to facilitate 
snob zoning and racial discriminationY Yet the vulnerability of 
housing programs to delay and increased financial burdens have 
caused some groups to institute litigation in hopes of crippling the 
project despite a probable lack of success in the courtroom. As one 
writer observes "the opposition which benefits from the application 
of §102(2)(C) requirements to subsidized housing projects is usually 
pursuing exclusionary objectives contrary to the spirit and values of 
the fourteenth amendment."88 Since NEPA pertains only to govern-
ment subsidized projects, a low income project on a given site might 
be defeated by the cost of compliance with NEPA while a private 
developer could then build a similar project (probably not low in-
come) without impediment.89 
" Ackerman, supra note 78, at 761. 
., [d. at 762. 
" [d. 
" Greene County Planning Comm'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412,419 (2d Cir.), 
cere. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). 
" Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See 
generally, C. Daffron, Using NEPA to Exclude the Poor, 4 ENV. AFF. 81 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Daffron] . 
.. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
" Daffron, supra note 85, at 82; Ackerman, supra note 78, at 758. 
M> Ackerman, supra note 78, at 755 . 
.. [d. at 789. 
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In addition to the above procedural deficiencies of NEPA as ap-
plied to housing, HUD's institutional inertia is also a problem. HUD 
has a history of trying to avoid compliance with NEPA.90 The ex-
planation for this attitude lies in part with the procedural problems 
discussed above, but evidence exists that HUD's insufficient com-
pliance also stems from resentment over past problems with 
NEPA.91 This resentment may now be so deep-seated that even if 
the procedural deficiencies of NEPA were eliminated, HUD would 
resist compliance. 
If problems with NEPA and federal review exist, so do serious 
drawbacks to local control over environmental review. The most 
striking disadvantage is that environmental impacts often extend 
beyond artificial borders. The Community Development Act pro-
vides only generalized mandates to consider regional environmental 
impacts,92 and the HUD regulations implementing the Act do not 
require meaningful regional environmental review. 93 This considera-
tion has inspired opposition to local control over environmental re-
view. 94 Another reason to doubt the wisdom of local environmental 
"" A recent report of the General Accounting Office charges that HUD's NEPA compliance 
has been poor. Through June 30, 1974, HUD filed only 81 impact statements on nearly 30,000 
project proposals, and the statements were of low quality. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT EF-
FORTS FOR PROPOSED PROJECTS HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE-DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT, GAO (RED-75-393l, at 11, 20 (July 22, 1975) [hereinafter cited as GAO 
REPORT]. See also 120 CONGo REC. 14884 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974) (remarks of Senator Jack-
son). 
HUD defends its efforts at environmental compliance with every conceivable argument, 
asserting 1) that its environmental compliance should not be judged solely on the number of 
impact statements filed, 2) that the number of impact statements filed by HUD is increasing 
dramatically, 3) that the other federal agencies engaged in similar activities are even worse 
at environmental enforcement, and 4) that inconsistent and unpredictable judicial interpre-
tation of NEPA make compliance difficult. Telephone interview with James Shumar, Princi-
pal Program Officer, Environmental Planning Division of HUD, November 10, 1975 
[hereinafter cited as Shumar Interview]. See also Memo from James F. Miller to HUD 
Regional Offices regarding NEPA Oversight Hearings by the House of Representatives (Sept. 
26, 1975) (on file at ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS office, Newton, MA) [hereinafter cited as Miller 
Memo] . 
• 1 When discussing NEPA, HUD officials often point to its past abuse for exclusionary 
purposes and the unpredictability of NEPA decisions. Memo from David O. Meeker, Coordi-
nator of Community Planning and Development, to HUD Regional Offices regarding NEPA 
Oversight Hearings by the House of Representatives, at 10 (Sept. 7, 1975) (on file at 
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS office, Newton, MA) [hereinafter cited as Meeker Memo]. See also 
Miller Memo, supra note 90. 
" 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(1) (Supp. 1974). 
93 The HUD regulations require only that the environmental appraisal be "on as compre-
hensive a scale as is feasible." 24 C.F.R. § 58.5(2)(g) (1975). 
" Memo from Andrew Biemiller to Henry Schechter (July 19, 1974) in 120 CONGo REC. 
14889 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974), wherein the AFL-CIO outlines its opposition to Section 
104(h)(1) due to failure to consider regional environmental impacts [hereinafter cited as 
AFL-CIO Memo]. 
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review is the lack of technical expertise available at the community 
level. The Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality ex-
pressed his support for local control of environmental review be-
cause communities had recently developed the necessary machinery 
to undertake such review. 95 Yet proponents of Section 104(h)(1) in 
the House justified the move to local control in order to encourage 
the development of the expertise. 96 No extended discussion of the 
ability of local governments to handle environmental reviews oc-
curredY Recent studies indicate that the necessary technical exper-
tise does not presently exist on the community level and that a lack 
of effective environmental review is one of the most serious flaws in 
the community development program.98 
As pointed out in Conservation Society, preparation of EIS's by 
applicants for federal funds has other disadvantages. Applicants are 
likely to make unconscious choices which might not be reflected in 
the EIS, but which could foreclose alternatives potentially less det-
rimental to the environment.99 Local applicants are unlikely to have 
the sophisticated legal advice to allow them to order their affairs to 
avoid the complex legal pitfalls of NEPA compliance. lOo Given 
HUD's own environmental review record, that agency is unlikely to 
be of much assistance. Local control of environmental review also 
involves less visibility than preparation by a state or federal 
agency. 101 Such low visibility makes it more difficult for interested 
" Memo from R. Peterson to Representative Reuss, June 12, 1974 in 120 CONGo REC. 14888 
(daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974). 
" 120 CONGo REC. 8432 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1974). 
" Section 116 of the Housing and Community Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5316(c) 
(Supp. IV, 1974) does provide that the recipients of block grants can use up to 10% of their 
grant for planning activities. Therefore, some financial assistance for EIS preparation is 
provided. However, critics of the provision claim that this financial assistance is far from 
adequate. Comments of the United States Environmental Protection Agency to HUD's 
Proposed Environmental Regulations of Oct. 10, 1974 (on file at HUD's Washington, D.C. 
Office). 
" The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reports that the quality of 
ErS's filed pursuant to the HUD regulations varies greatly. Some of the statements are far 
too detailed; others are superficial. This variation indicates that applicants have no accurate 
sense of NEPA's requirements. There is also indication that community development funds 
are not being requested because of reluctance to undertake NEPA responsibilities. Both HUD 
and the EPA have begun investigations. 6 BNA ENV. REP.-CURR. DEV. 1074 (Oct. 24, 1975). 
A recent study published in the ,JOURNAL OF HOUSING identifies compliance with NEPA as the 
major problem with the community developments program. 9 J.O.H. 445 (Oct. 1975). 
" 508 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated sub nom., Coleman v. Conservation Society of 
Southern Vermont, 44 U.S.L.W. 3181 (U.S., Oct. 10, 1975). 
100 Comments of the Conn. Urban Renewal Ass'n to the Proposed HUD Environmental 
Regulations of Oct. 10, 1974 at 2 (on file at HUD's Washington, D.C. Office). 
101 AFL-CrO Memo., supra note 94. 
138 ·ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:121 
environmentalists to monitor the decision process. 
The disadvantages of local preparation of an EIS might conceiv-
ably be offset by federal agency participation or review. Section 
104(h)(1), however, may preclude such review. It provides that 
HUD shall approve any application unless: 1) it is plainly inconsist-
ent with the housing needs of the area; 2) it is clearly an inappro-
priate plan for implementation of housing goals; or 3) the applica-
tion does not comply with other provisions of Title I of the Com-
munity Development Act or other applicable law.'02 The third 
ground constitutes the only possible basis upon which an applica-
tion could be refused for insufficient environmental review. Al-
though this third ground functions as a residual or "catch all" 
clause, it is uncertain whether the courts will give this clause any 
substantive effect. 
An argument can be made that less effective environmental en-
forcement was a necessary tradeoff in order to affect local control 
over community development. The Community Development Act 
was drafted to implement increased local control over the spending 
of funds, and was thus an outgrowth of the "new federalism. "103 
Section 104(h)(1), by providing for local control of environmental 
review, is consistent with this goal. Local control is thought to in-
crease citizen interest in a project, thus encouraging closer correla-
tion between planning and implementation of projects. 104 Increased 
citizen input may result in projects being more closely tailored to 
local needs, and give citizens a greater role in allocation of resources. 
Additionally, the federal government maintains considerable con-
trol over selected aspects of the community development program. 
For instance, the block grants can be used only for specified types 
of projects, and the federal agency annually maintains compliance 
with the program. 105 Also, the funds may not be used inconsistently 
with federal civil rights legislation. lOB .congress thus made excep-
tions to the general thrust of the Community Development Act 
toward local control. Federal environmental review through the 
usual NEPA procedures could have been retained without seriously 
damaging local control objectives. Commentators analyzing analo-
gous federal block grant programs have concluded that NEPA com-
'02 Housing and Community Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c) (Supp. 1974). 
,03 120 CONGo REC. 5367 (daily ed. June 20, 1974) (remarks of Representative Anderson). 
, •• Meeker Memo, supra note 91, at 10. Cf. Remarks of Laurence Aurbach, ABA Annual 
Convention 1975, 6 BNA ENV. REP.-CUR. DEV. 656 (Aug. 22, 1975). 
,.5 42 U.S.C. § 5304 (Supp. 1974). 
, .. 42 U.S.C. § 5309 (Supp. 1974). 
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pliance would not significantly interfere with substantive local con-
trol objectives. \07 
In summary, telling arguments have been advanced in favor of 
exempting HUD from the usual NEPA procedures. NEPA can be 
an awkward instrument as applied to government housing. The 
delay and increased financial burden have made compliance costly. 
NEPA has been abused by community groups opposed to low in-
come housing, and a problem of institutional inertia has arisen in 
HUD's apparent dislike for NEPA. With effort these disadvantages 
might be overcome. That effort might be better directed toward 
devising an environmental review system which would be more ap-
propriate to housing programs. 
Unfortunately, the Community Development Act took neither 
approach. It offered no new incentives to developers to comply with 
NEPA and proposed no alternative to NEPA. The Community De-
velopment Act merely passed the difficulties of NEP A compliance 
one step down the line, making compliance more difficult and less 
effective. The one possible advantage of this approach was that it 
may result in less interference by environmentalists. If this was the 
real aim of Section 104(h) (1), Congress should merely have ex-
empted HUD from environmental review requirements. 
Even granting that local control is desirable in some circumstan-
ces, federal environmental review need not interfere with substan-
tive local decisions. NEPA does not require a particular result in a 
given case, but mandates only that environmental impacts be 
recognized and considered. If a community is aware of adverse envi-
ronmental impacts of a project, but decides to proceed nevertheless, 
NEPA is unlikely to stand in the way. lOS 
D. HUD Regulations Pursuant to Section 104(h)(l) 
Doubts concerning the wisdom of Section 104(h)(1) were com-
pounded by the regulations promulgated by HUD to implement 
that subsection. 109 The regulations were proposed in October, 
107 The foremost discussion of the Revenue Sharing Program concludes that application of 
NEPA is consistent with the local control objectives of that program. Note, NEPA and 
Unrestricted Grants, 60 VA. L. REV. 114, 136 (1974). See also Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th 
Cir. 1971), for a discussion of NEPA as applied to the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration block grant program. 
,., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 
1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
, •• 24 C.F.R. § 58 (1975). 
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1974,110 finalized in January, 1975,111 and modified in July, 1975.112 
The regulations and the public reaction to them illustrate the con-
flicting forces brought to bear on the EIS delegation issue. 
Those favoring strict environmental review have claimed that the 
regulations go beyond the intent of Congress. The regulations pro-
vide for delegation of NEPA responsibility for all Title I grants with 
only minor exceptions. 1I3 The applicant has no choice as to whether 
it will accept NEPA responsibility. The regulations require delega-
tion regardless of whether the applicant has the technical expertise 
to carry out an environmental review. The applicant is able to avoid 
responsibility for NEPA compliance only by claiming "legal inca-
pacity."114 Legal incapacity exists when an applicant is forbidden by 
its charter or constitution from accepting the responsibility.115 This 
condition is difficult to prove, and the procedural prerequisites to a 
finding of legal incapacity are prohibitory.116 
Environmentalists have claimed that this required delegation 
extends beyond the mandate of Section 104(h)(1).117 Section 
104(h)(1) provides that HUD may delegate NEPA responsibilities 
"for particular projects." That phrasing may imply that HUD re-
tains the responsibility to analyze each project to gauge the desira-
bility of delegation in each case. Such individualized project consid-
eration would result in retention of some federal agency control over 
EIS preparation. 
The delegation of NEPA responsibilities under the regulations is 
extensive. HUD does not normally even receive a copy of the EIS 
prepared by the applicant, for the applicant need only certify to 
HUD that the environmental review is completeYs The regulations 
1111 39 Fed. Reg. 36553 (Oct. 10, 1974). 
"' 40 Fed. Reg. 1391 (Jan. 7, 1975). 
"' 40 Fed. Reg. 29991 (July 16, 1975). 
"' 24 C.F.R. § 58.5 (1975). 
'" [d. 
'15 Interview with David Prescott, Environmental Review Officer for HUD Region I, Nov. 
10, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Interview with David Prescott]. 
"' For example, if an applicant is found legally incapable of one project, it is prohibited 
from accepting responsibility for all projects for the entire year. If an applicant does not 
request a finding of incapacity before filing the original application, it waives the right to 
claim legal incapacity. 24 C.F.R. § 58.5(b)(1) (1975). The effect of a finding of incapacity does 
not excuse an applicant from its obligation to prepare an EIS, but only from legal responsibil-
ity for it. No claims of legal incapacity have been made to date in HUD Region I. Interview 
with David Prescott, supra note 115. 
117 Comments of Conn. Urban Renewal Ass'n, supra note 100, at 1. 
'" 24 C.F.R. § 48.17(e). HUD is designated in Appendix II of the CEQ guidelines (40 C.F.R. 
§ 1500) (1975) as one of the agencies with special expertise in housing. NEPA requires in 
Section 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970), that "the responsible Federal official shall 
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do establish a procedure whereby a citizen can challenge the release 
of funds for a project if the applicant has not complied with certain 
procedural requirements during the environmental review. In that 
case, HUD will review only the procedure followed by the applicant, 
not the substance of the applicant's environmental analysis. 1I9 
The Community Development Act provides that HUD should 
approve an application only after the applicant has shown that 
citizens have been given an opportunity to participate in the prepa-
ration of the application. 120 Yet the HUD regulations provide that 
the decision as to whether to hold public hearings remains com-
pletely within the discretion of the applicant.121 HUD will review an 
applicant's hearing procedure if hearings are held, but will not re-
view an applicant's decision to hold no hearings at all. 122 
The procedures established by the regulations contain an addi-
tional flaw. If an applicant finds that the project requires EIS prepa-
ration, the regulations prescribe procedures which the applicant 
must follow and which HUD will review. 123 If an applicant 
determines that no ErS is required, however, the regulations pre-
scribe few procedural requirements. After publishing a statement of 
intent not to file an EIS and reasons therefor, the applicant must 
allow a period for public comments. The environmental review pro-
cess will then be complete unless the applicant determines that 
further consideration is necessary. 124 
Some of the questionable provisions in the regulations are argua-
bly authorized by Section 104(h)(1). For example, NEPA does not 
specifically require public hearings. Thus, some rational ground ex-
ists to justify HUD's decision not to require hearings. 125 Other provi-
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law 
or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved." 
'19 24 C.F.R. § 58.31(a), (b) (1975). 
'''' 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(6)(C) (Supp. 1974). 
12' NEPA does not require public hearings, and HUD asserts that in keeping with the 
theory of local control, it should not impose on applicants procedures which are more strict 
than those imposed by NEPA. Shumar Interview, supra note 90. This approach ignores the 
fact that the Community Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(6)(B) (Supp. 1974), may 
require more extensive citizen participation than does NEPA. 
122 24 C.F.R. § 58.31(a), (b) (1975). 
'23 24 C.F.R. § 58.17 (1975). 
'24 24 C.F.R. § 58.16 (1975). 
125 See note 121, supra. Another questionable provision of the HUD regulation establishes 
overly mechanical threshold tests to determine whether the project is a "major Federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" and thus subject to NEPA. The 
regulations provide that projects of a given size require EIS preparation. 24 C.F.R. § 58.25 
(1975). This provision implies that projects of a smaller size do not require EIS preparation. 
HUD has been criticized in the past for use of such mechanical tests which are not consistent 
142 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:121 
sions in the regulations are clearly beyond the authorization of Sec-
tion l04(h)(1). For example, the regulations provide for delegation 
of HUD's responsibilities under the National Historic Preservation 
Act despite the complete absence of statutory authority for the dele-
gation. 126 Most provisions fall on the borderline, and must be viewed 
in light of the more general mandate of Section 104(h)(1). 
On one hand, Section 104(h)(1) was meant to allow local control 
over environmental assessment, in accord with the overall thrust of 
the Community Development Act.127 Substantive review of applica-
tions by HUD is limited to very narrow grounds. 128 Section l04(h)(1) 
provides that the applicant may "assume all of the responsibilities 
for environmental review." On the other hand, Section 104(h)(1) did 
explicitly provide that it had been enacted "[iJn order to assure 
that the policies of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
are most effectively implemented ... and to assure the public 
undiminished protection of the environment .... "129 The section, 
then, was not to be a carte blanche requirement of delegation. The 
whole of Section l04(h)(1) must be interpreted in light of this man-
date to assure continued protection of the environment. The section 
authorized only that degree of delegation consistent with this gen-
eral mandate. 
CONCLUSION 
Senator Henry Jackson, the author of NEPA, said of Section 
104(h)(1) of the Community Development Act: 
Proponents of this NEPA exemption would argue that the force and 
effect of NEPA is not changed, that the responsibility has simply been 
transferred from HUD to the State and local governments. This glib 
response ignores the fa~t that the most basic purpose of NEPA was to 
hold the Federal government responsible for maintaining the quality of 
our environment. . . . Let no one be mistaken that this exemption, by 
permitting the delegation of the impact statement responsibility, denies 
the most basic purpose of NEPA: the requirement of Federal accounta-
bility,130 
with the spirit of NEPA, which demands each project be evaluated on its merits in light of 
all the circumstances. NEPA and HUn, supra note 77, at 889. 
121 24 C.F.R. § 58.24 (1975). 
127 120 CONGo REC. 5367 (daily ed. June 20, 1974). 
to. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c) (Supp. 1974). 
121 42 U.S.C. § 5304(h)(1) (Supp. 1974). 
138 120 CONGo REC. 14884 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1974). 
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Congress and the courts have generally been sensitive to this NEPA 
requirement of federal accountability. The courts of appeals in 
Conservation Society and Life of the Land disagreed over the degree 
to which states could participate in the preparation of EIS's, but 
both courts insisted that the federal agency accept ultimate respon-
sibility for NEPA compliance. 13I Congress drafted the 1975 amend-
ment to NEPA so as to limit the erosion of federal accountability. 
HUn, however, has shown no such sensitivity to the requirement 
of NEPA. A report of the General Accounting Office (GAO Re-
port) 132 substantiated HUn's reputation for poor environmental per-
formance. HUn's reluctance stemmed in part from the burden of 
NEPA compliance and the abuse of NEPA by those opposed to low 
income housing. 133 
A solution to the apparent conflict might begin with a more effi-
cient adaptation of NEPA to the needs of housing programs. Careful 
definition of the types of social impacts to be considered under 
NEPA would prevent its abuse by persons desiring to exclude low 
income housing from their neighborhoods. Delays encountered pur-
suant to NEPA compliance could be minimized if cases involving 
housing projects were given priority in the courtS. 134 The financial 
burdens of environmental compliance must be recognized as a nec-
essary cost in housing construction, and must be fully provided for 
in annual appropriations. The GAO Report suggested that reorgani-
zation within HUn and more specific environmental guidance to 
agency personnel would greatly improve NEPA complianceYs 
On the other hand, perhaps NEPA may not be the most efficient 
means of reconciling housing and community development needs. 
An alternative procedure which recognizes the vulnerability ofhous-
ing programs to financial burdens and delay might be created. 
Clearly, the procedures established by the Community Develop-
ment Act and the Hun regulations are unsatisfactory. HUD has not 
adequately faced the problem of conflicting housing programs and 
environmental goals. Instead, NEPA problems have merely been 
passed along to local authorities who are even less able to handle 
131 See text at note 21, supra. 
132 GAO REPORT, supra note 90. 
133 Id. at 41 (HUn reaction to GAO REPORT). 
134 One obvious difficulty with this scheme is that many so-called "priority" programs 
might also demand streamlined court procedures for NEPA litigation. To the extent that this 
is a problem, the immediacy of housing needs and the disgraceful human suffering resulting 
from failure to satisfy those needs place housing programs in a special status. 
135 GAO REPORT, supra note 90, at 43. 
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them efficiently. The result has been less effective environmental 
enforcement, and continued interference with community develop-
ment programs. The fault lies partly with Congress for enacting 
Section 104(h)(1) of the Community Development Act, and partly 
with HUD for the regulations implementing the program. The need 
for a national approach to environmental priorities was the original 
rationale behind NEPA. The effort should not so quickly be aban-
doned. 
